Digital platforms dominance abuse(in Google case in Russia)
EDN: XVBVET
Abstract
The article aims to reveal the degree to which network effects in demand and multisided platform model has influenced on antitrust regulation of Google strategy in relations with manufacturers of Android-devices, for example, on investigation of the FAS of Russia.The article reveals the chronology of events, characterizing the development of «FAS Russia vs. Google» case, The logic and conclusiveness of the decision of the FAS Russia analyzed on the recognition of Google abusing its dominant position in the market pre-installed app stores, to reduce competition in applications markets. Paper examines decisions of courts of the Russian Federation, hearing the Google protest on the decision of the FAS Russia.The article compares the anticompetitive actions of Google with actions of Microsoft, considered in the famous antitrust investigations in Europe and the United States. Actions differ only at the level of tactics, but at the strategic level Google competitive behavior completely repeats anticompetitive actions Microsoft.
About the Authors
R. VartaevR. Garaev
A. Kovalenko
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Review
For citations:
Vartaev R., Garaev R., Kovalenko A. Digital platforms dominance abuse(in Google case in Russia). Journal of Modern Competition. 2016;10(5):89-141. EDN: XVBVET
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