Lobbying for protection by oligopolists and lobbying coordination
EDN: VILWJX
Abstract
The agents with the similar purposes of lobbying are interested in coordination of their lobbying efforts. Nevertheless, the free rider problem often takes place. In the article the problem of the free rider is illustrated on the example of lobbying for protection by the domestic oligopolists acting as Cournot rivals. It is shown that in the equilibrium with voluntary contribution only firms with smallest marginal costs or greatest marginal costs contribute. As a result, total lobbying expenditure is less than optimum level defined as total domestic oligopolists profit maximization problem solution. Total lobbying expenditures is optimal under share equilibrium and Groves-Clarke mechanism.
About the Authors
S. AgabekovE. Levina
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Review
For citations:
Agabekov S., Levina E. Lobbying for protection by oligopolists and lobbying coordination. Journal of Modern Competition. 2015;9(5):107-118. EDN: VILWJX
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