Using remedies in Russian merger control: descrete choice analisys
EDN: VILWHZ
Abstract
This article is motivated by a growing interest in the problem of merger control quality assessment. Remedies are one of the instruments of merger control and have a significant influence on the results of it. This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies implementation in Russian merger control. The database consists of 502 merger cases accepted by the Russian antimonopoly agency between 2010 and 2012. We analyse the agency’s decisions to find which characteristics of merging firms and markets lead the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation to decide whether to allow conditional acceptance. We find that variables related to high market power such as high market share and significant entry barriers lead more frequently result in a remedy outcome. Such industries as the coal mining and chemical industry positively affect the probability of a remedy implementation. At the same time we do not find significant effects of such high-concentrated industries as energy and gas. In addition, the results also demonstrate that if one of the 5 giant firms take part in a merger, it has a positive effect on the probability of the remedy decisions. Our study did not detect the influence of the firm- buyer’s countries on using remedies.
References
1. Авдашева С. Б., Калинина М. М. Предписания участникам слияний (сравнительный анализ практики Федеральной антимонопольной службы России и Европейской комиссии по конкуренции) // Экономическая политика. 2012. № 1. С. 141-158
2. Авдашева C., Дзагурова Н., Крючкова П., Юсупова Г.Развитие и применение антимонопольного законодательства в России: по пути достижений и заблуждений.М.: Изд. дом Высшей школы экономики, 2011. URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/04/05/1211687919/A_D_K_Yu. pdf (дата обращения: 11.11.2014)
3. Вербик М. Путеводитель по современной эконометрике: пер. с англ. М., 2008. - 616 с
4. Сушкевич А. Ex post оценка эффектов решений антимонопольного органа как часть административной процедуры // Экономическая политика. 2012. № 1. С. 159-171
5. Сушкевич А. Г., Авдашева С. Б., Маркин М. Е. Социологические методы в оценке эффектов государственной политики (на примере антимонопольного контроля слияний) // Современная конкуренция. 2013. № 2 (38). C. 3-18
6. Шаститко А. Ошибки I и II рода в сфере антимонопольного контроля сделок экономической концентрации // Экономическая политика. 2012. № 1. С. 95-117
7. A study of the Commission's divestiture process, FTC,1999. Available at: https: //www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ files/attachments/merger-review/divestiture. pdf (дата обращения: 12.11.2014)
8. Aktas N., Bodt E. de and Roll R. Market Response to European Regulation of Business Combinations // Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Vol. 39. Nо. 3. December 2004. Р. 731-757
9. Andreasson J., Sundqvist C. The Impact of the 2004 EC Merger Regulation. An Empirical Study // Working Paper.2008. Р. 1-29
10. Bavasso A., Lindsay A. Causation in EC Merger Control // Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 2007. Vol. 3. Issue. 2. Р. 181-202
11. Bergman M., Jakobsson M., Razo C. An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions // International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 23. Nо. 9.2005. Р. 717-737
12. Bougette P., Turolla S. Market structures, political surroundings, and merger remedies: an empirical investigation of the EC's decisions // European Journal of Law and Economics. 2008 April. Vol. 25. Issue 2. Р. 125-150
13. Duso T., Gugler K. and Yurtoglu B. B. EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment. Discussion Paper SP II 2005 - 16, 2005. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. URL: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2005/ii05-16.pdf
14. Duso T. Gugler K. and Yurtoglu B. B. How effective is European merger control? // European Economic Review. 2011. Vol. 55. Nо. 7. Р. 980-1006
15. Gugler K., Siebert R. Market power versus efficiency effects of mergers and research joint ventures: evidence from the semiconductor industry // Working Paper 10323.2004. Р. 1-36
16. Khemani R., Shapiro D. An Empirical Analysis of Canadian Merger Policy // The Journal of Industrial Economics. 1993. Vol. XLI. Nо. 2. June. Р. 161-177
17. Long W., Schramm R., Tollison R. The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity // Journal of Law and Economics.1973. Vol. 16. Nо. 2. October. P. 351-364
18. «Merger Remedies Study», European Commission, 2005.URL: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study. pdf (дата обращения: 12.11.2014)
19. Motta M. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. - 606 p
20. Postema B., Goppelsroeder M., Bergeijk P. Cost and Benefits of Merger Control: An Applied Game Theoretic Perspective // KYKLOS. 2006. Vol. 59. Nо. 1. Р. 85-96
21. Ronnholm G. An Econometric Analysis of the Merger Decisions of the Swedish Competition Authority during1993-2009 // Working Paper. 2010. Р. 1-47
22. Salinger M. Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure // The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1988. Vol. 103. Nо. 2. P. 345-356
23. Williamson O. Economies as an antitrust defense: the welfare tradeoffs // American Economic Review. 1968. Mar. Vol. 58. No. 1. Р. 18-36
Review
For citations:
Red'kina A. Using remedies in Russian merger control: descrete choice analisys. Journal of Modern Competition. 2015;9(5):5-24. EDN: VILWHZ
Email this article 