Non-competitive agreements between auction participants: the case of Russia
EDN: UXUXKX
Abstract
Non-competitive behavior of auction participants is a serious problem, leading to losses of economic efficiency of projects where the mechanism is used. Such violations are quite common in Russia and are traditionally in the focus of attention of antitrust authority. In practice, the prosecution of competition-restricting agreements is often problematic, given the diversity of their forms and underdeveloped standards of proof. This, in turn, weakens the deterrent effect of antitrust prohibitions.The purpose of the article is to assess the role of the parameters of the auctions and standards of proof applied in the Russian antitrust investigations which they play in opposition to the conclusion of the competition-restricting agreements in competitive bidding. To achieve this goal in this study we generalize the results of theoretical studies devoted to the analysis of collusion in auctions. We also analyze the most common violations of the antitrust law by auction participants found in the Russian practice. The case study method is used to identify the parameters of the auctions, facilitating entering into competition-restricting agreements, as well as problematic issues related to attracting bidders to justice for anti-competitive behaviour.
About the Author
S. GolovanovaReferences
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For citations:
Golovanova S. Non-competitive agreements between auction participants: the case of Russia. Journal of Modern Competition. 2015;9(4):65-76. EDN: UXUXKX
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