Влияние институциональных кооперативных взаимодействийна конкурентную стратегию развития промышленных предприятий

В статье приводится консолидация подходов различных научных школ к изучению кооперативных взаимодействий промышленных предприятий в форме бизнес-ассоциаций. Обозначены позиции сторонников новой институциональной теории, организационно-институциональной теории, теории социальных потрясений, теории корпоративизма и метаорганизаций. Исходя из теоретических взглядов, выводится гипотеза, что кооперативные взаимодействия в форме бизнес-ассоциаций способствуют формированию конкурентной стратегии развития промышленных предприятий в российских условиях. На основе статистических данных произведена группировка региональных отделений Российского союза промышленников и предпринимателей (РСПП) с применением методики Джианга для совокупностей, характеризующихся распределением с утяжеленными хвостами, что характерно для российской действительности. При помощи непараметрического теста критерия Краскела-Уоллиса гипотеза подтверждена, тест Данна показал определенные группы, где данные различия значительны. Проведена группировка региональных отделений РСПП по количеству членов и показаны различия между показателями, характеризующими развитие промышленных предприятий внутри выделяемых групп (ввод основных фондов предприятий обрабатывающих отраслей, использование передовых технологий, число созданных производственных технологий, инвестиции с участием иностранного капитала). Даны рекомендации для менеджеров промышленных предприятий, а также очерчены направления дальнейших исследований.

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