References

moco

Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition

Journal of Modern Competition

1993-75982687-0657

Московский университет «Синергия»

TXOSTB

moco-656

Research Article

Статьи

Влияние институциональных кооперативных взаимодействийна конкурентную стратегию развития промышленных предприятий

Effect of institutional cooperative interactionson competitive strategy of development of industrial enterprises

Кукаев

И.С.

Kukaev

ikukaev4phd@gmail.com

Удмуртский государственный университетUdmurt State University

2015

13082025

9290110

2025

Кукаев И.

Kukaev I.

Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/656

В статье приводится консолидация подходов различных научных школ к изучению кооперативных взаимодействий промышленных предприятий в форме бизнес-ассоциаций. Обозначены позиции сторонников новой институциональной теории, организационно-институциональной теории, теории социальных потрясений, теории корпоративизма и метаорганизаций. Исходя из теоретических взглядов, выводится гипотеза, что кооперативные взаимодействия в форме бизнес-ассоциаций способствуют формированию конкурентной стратегии развития промышленных предприятий в российских условиях. На основе статистических данных произведена группировка региональных отделений Российского союза промышленников и предпринимателей (РСПП) с применением методики Джианга для совокупностей, характеризующихся распределением с утяжеленными хвостами, что характерно для российской действительности. При помощи непараметрического теста критерия Краскела-Уоллиса гипотеза подтверждена, тест Данна показал определенные группы, где данные различия значительны. Проведена группировка региональных отделений РСПП по количеству членов и показаны различия между показателями, характеризующими развитие промышленных предприятий внутри выделяемых групп (ввод основных фондов предприятий обрабатывающих отраслей, использование передовых технологий, число созданных производственных технологий, инвестиции с участием иностранного капитала). Даны рекомендации для менеджеров промышленных предприятий, а также очерчены направления дальнейших исследований.

The article is primarily concerned with theoretical views of different scientific schools on the topic of cooperative interactions of industrial enterprises in the form of business associations. Positions of supporters of New Institutional Economics, Organizational Institutional Theory, theory of social disruptions, corporatism theory, and theory of meta-organizations are outlined. Based on theoretical grounds, the hypothesis is put forward which states that cooperative interactions in the form of business-associations facilitate formation of competitive strategy for development of industrial enterprises in modern Russia. The clustering of regional offices of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) is performed using Jieng’s method of head/tail breaks for samples with heavy tailed distribution, which is the case in Russia. With the use of nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test, the stated hypothesis is accepted and Dunn’s test is used to show the particular groups that have a significant differences. Classification of regional offices of RUIE by is made and the difference between parameters that characterize development of industrial enterprises within the groups is shown (capital assets put into operation, technology innovations costs spent, number of production technologies created, foreign investments). Recommendations for managers of industrial enterprises are given, the avenues for further research are delineated as well.

кооперативные взаимодействияпромышленные предприятияконкурентная стратегия развитияроссийский союз промышленников и предпринимателейколлективные действияинституты

cooperative interactionsindustrial enterprisescompetitive strategy for developmentRussian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurscollective actionsinstitutions

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.