BILATERAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS: APPROACHES TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP
EDN: RXFDUL
Abstract
This article analyzes the major trends in the consideration of the concept of specific investments, as a party receives the partner positive effects of their implementation have a significant impact on the possibility of further interaction. In modern literature, there is no single definition is not specific investments, in some works the notion of selfish-specific investments in other cooperative specific investments. It is therefore relevant to assess their effect on the behavior of the parties and the conclusions of the authors of contemporary works.
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Review
For citations:
Agamirova M. BILATERAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS: APPROACHES TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. Journal of Modern Competition. 2013;(2):46-54. EDN: RXFDUL
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