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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">RXFDUL</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-538</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Подходы к определению характера взаимосвязи двусторонних специфических инвестиций</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>BILATERAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS: APPROACHES TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Агамирова</surname><given-names>М.Е.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Agamirova</surname><given-names>M.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">magamirova@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ ВШЭ</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2013</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>46</fpage><lpage>54</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Агамирова М., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Агамирова М.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Agamirova M.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/538">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/538</self-uri><abstract><p>Статья посвящена анализу основных тенденций при рассмотрении понятия специфических инвестиций, поскольку получаемые сторонами-партнерами положительные эффекты от их осуществления в значительной степени влияют на возможность дальнейшего взаимодействия. В современной литературе не наблюдается единого определения специфических инвестиций, в некоторых работах используется понятие эгоистических специфических инвестиций, в других — кооперативных специфических инвестиций. Поэтому представляется актуальным оценить эффекты от их применения на поведение сторон и выводы авторов современных работ.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This article analyzes the major trends in the consideration of the concept of specific investments, as a party receives the partner positive effects of their implementation have a significant impact on the possibility of further interaction. In modern literature, there is no single definition is not specific investments, in some works the notion of selfish-specific investments in other cooperative specific investments. It is therefore relevant to assess their effect on the behavior of the parties and the conclusions of the authors of contemporary works.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>снижение стимулов к инвестированию</kwd><kwd>кооперативные специфические инвестиции</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>reducing incentives to invest</kwd><kwd>cooperative specific investments</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Acemoglu D., Aghion P., Grith R., Zilibotti F. Vertical integration and technology: Theory and evidence // Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010. № 8 (5). С. 989-1033.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Acemoglu D., Aghion P., Grith R., Zilibotti F. Vertical integration and technology: Theory and evidence // Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010. № 8 (5). 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