Sanctions as a Tool in International Competition

Abstract

The sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation continues and even increases with the adoption of the 18th package of sanctions, as well as the 19th package that is being prepared. The consideration in the US Senate of a bill to impose 500% duties on goods from countries that continue energy cooperation with the Russian Federation is another aspect of the US protectionist policy that needs to be analyzed from the standpoint of the purpose of sanctions pressure. In the same vein, we also consider the pressure on India and China in attempts to force them to stop purchasing Russian energy resources under the threat of introducing 100% duties on their goods when delivered to the United States. It should be noted that the current US administration prefers duties to sanctions. US President D. Trump has repeatedly spoken about this. However, for the Russian economy, it is not so much D. Trump's rhetoric that is important, but the essence of the restrictions being introduced. The article attempts to show that sanctions do not pursue the declared goals of forcing peace, but serve as a tool in the international competitive struggle for leadership in both technological and geopolitical terms, as well as in energy. By synthesizing economic theories developed to date, describing certain phenomena and behavioral patterns, it is proven that the purpose of sanctions is an attempt to maintain leadership positions in individual markets in a situation of inability to gain sustainable competitive advantages in other (more plausible) ways. The openly protectionist policy of the US administration is aimed not only at weakening its geopolitical opponents – the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, but also its satellites, primarily the European Union. The synthesis of theoretical achievements of predecessors, undertaken in this article, proves the use of sanctions precisely as a tool in international competition.