Moving Away from Consumer Welfare in the Antitrust of Digital Platforms

This article aims to characterize the new theoretical and methodological reversal observed today in the American antitrust regulation of digital platforms. To this end, the author retrospectively describes the history of the development of the theory and methodology of antitrust regulation in the United States. The article describes the ideas of economic structuralism of the “Harvard school”. Further, the author reveals the theoretical and methodological revolution associated with the theory of prices; describes the fundamental differences between the “Harvard” and “Chicago” schools in terms of assessing the relationship between market structure and the intensity of competition. The article reveals the formation of the doctrine of consumer welfare as the dominant one in antitrust regulation. The consequences of the application of the doctrine of consumer welfare in antitrust regulation are described: the narrowness of ideas about barriers to entry, public welfare; breadth of understanding of competitive forces; ignoring the structural and sectoral characteristics of competition; absolutization of indicators of consumer prices and output volumes. The author gives a negative assessment of the effectiveness of the application of the doctrine of consumer welfare in the antitrust regulation of digital platforms. The paper explains how the focus on consumer welfare has been used by digital platforms to generate gigantic market power. In this context, a criticism of the ideas of the Chicago School in relation to digital markets is presented. Reanimation of ideas and methods of economic structuralism in decision-making within the framework of antimonopoly regulation of monopolistic activities of digital platforms is argued.

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