Individual Abuse of Collective Dominance in Cellular Communications: Problems of Identification

Recently, discussions about the validity of the Russian practice of establishing the facts of individual abuse of collective dominance have been escalating: many experts point to a contradiction between the meaning of collective dominance, in which a small number of companies have a joint dominant position, in connection with each other, and the possibility of an individual company to abuse this position. The purpose of the article is to assess the correctness of this approach in the context of recent antitrust cases in the cellular communications market - in particular, two cases against the mobile operator “Tele2”. In the article, the applied practice is assessed in relation to the currently known results in the field of economic theory, as well as international best practices in the application of the concept of collective dominance. The findings indicate that the conclusion of the FAS Russia on the presence of the dominant position of Tele2 as part of collective dominance and the possibility of the company to exercise its market power does not correspond to either foreign practice or industrial organization theory. The source of error in the qualification of behavior is largely due to the focus of the antimonopoly authority on quantitative criteria of collective dominance to the detriment of the analysis of qualitative criteria and behavior. This case illustrates a typical tendency for such cases not to investigate the behavior of other collectively dominant market participants in relation to the behavior of the company accused of individual abuse, as well as not to investigate consumer behavior, and, in particular, their real possibilities to switch and switching actions. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.

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