Structural Alternatives of the Method of Comparable Markets in Implementing Antitrust Law
EDN: YRQBHJ
Abstract
The basic idea of using comparable markets for antitrust analysis is discussed. The structural alternatives of the method are presented, including the «before-and-after», «yardstick» and «bench-mark» variations, as well as a synthetic method, combining traits of the first three. A link is established between the requirements for the applied method of analyzing comparable markets, the criteria used to determine them and the research objectives - establishing the fact if an excessive or predatory price has been set and estimating the harm from an anticompetitive practice. International practice in applying the method of comparable markets in antitrust is analyzed based on cases from the EU, separate EU countries and the South-African Republic.
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Review
For citations:
Shastitko A., Golovanova S. Structural Alternatives of the Method of Comparable Markets in Implementing Antitrust Law. Journal of Modern Competition. 2017;11(2):5-17. EDN: YRQBHJ
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