Mutualism: Mutually Beneficial Cooperation between Competing Firms (Cases of Russian Companies)

This article examines the phenomenon of positive cooperation between competing firms (mutualism) – it documents and discusses previously unexplored cases of this type of behavior by Russian companies. It analyzes agreements between competitors that lead not to the selfish gain of a group of companies at the expense of other participants and consumers (similar to a cartel agreement), but to institutional improvements in the market. The literature review revealed three independent theoretical approaches to explain the possibility of positive cooperation between competitors: (1) an approach that links it to an increase in the level of trust in the economy; (2) an approach that was formed on the basis of a broad interpretation of the goals of antitrust regulation; (3) an approach that considers the system of cooperating firms as an effective hybrid organization. In Russia, collective anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts are examined (e. g., the Honest Position association (electrical engineering), the ROSS CC (security services), and anti-fraud cooperation between banks through the FinCERT division of the Bank of Russia). Both successful (Honest Position, Electrokabel, the LED and LED Systems Manufacturers Association, and the Aluminum Association) and unsuccessful (Lukhovitsky Cucumbers) efforts to ensure the quality of products circulating on the market are examined. It has been proposed that the biological stress gradient hypothesis also applies to economics. According to this hypothesis, in a favorable environment (low stress), competition prevails, i. e., negative, mutually damaging interactions between participants. Meanwhile, in a highly stressful environment, positive, mutually beneficial relationships (mutualism) are more likely to form.

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