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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.37791/1993-7598-2020-14-2-89-105</article-id><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">NUWOJS</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-895</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Ограничения рыночной власти цифровых платформ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Limits of market power of digital platforms</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Коваленко</surname><given-names>Александр Иванович</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kovalenko</surname><given-names>A.I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">alkovalenko@synergy.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Университет «Синергия»</aff><aff xml:lang="en">Synergy University</aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>89</fpage><lpage>105</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Коваленко А., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Коваленко А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kovalenko A.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/895">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/895</self-uri><abstract><p>Есть несколько важных свойств и факторов, которые следует оценить для принятия решения о рыночной силе и монопольной власти цифровой платформы. В статье рассматриваются примеры цифровых платформ - агрегаторы такси и мессенджеры, демонстрирующие различные внутренние и внешние факторы, являющиеся ограничителями рыночной власти цифровых платформ. В работе рассматривается ситуация с агрегаторами такси на примере лидера отрасли - Uber. На этом примере раскрываются внутренние факторы, ограничивающие рыночную власть. В статье рассматривается несколько примеров платформ, которые сталкиваются с внешними ограничениями рыночной власти платформ. Внутренние и внешние факторы, ограничивающие рыночную власть цифровых платформ, рекомендуется исследовать при анализе и оценке уровня конкуренции на рынках и принятии решения о том, занимает ли цифровая платформа доминирующее положение на отраслевом рынке.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>There are several equally important properties and factors that should be evaluated to decide on the market power and monopoly power of the digital platform.The article discusses examples of digital platforms - taxi aggregators and messengers, demonstrating various internal and external factors that are limiting the market power of digital platforms.First of all, the situation with taxi aggregators is considered, using the example of the industry leader - Uber - the platform leading in several countries stably brings only losses to investors. This example reveals the internal factors that limit market power.The following is an example of instant messengers and Twitter, which are faced with external restrictions on the market power of platforms.The listed internal and external factors limiting the market power of digital platforms is recommended to be investigated when analyzing and assessing the level of competition in the markets and deciding whether the digital platform occupies a dominant position in the industry market.</p></trans-abstract></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Cusumano M. A., Gawer A., Yoffie D. B. The Business of Platforms: Strategy in the Age of Digital Competition, Innovation, and Power. Нью-Йорк: HarperCollins, 2019. - 320 с.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Cusumano M. A., Gawer A., Yoffie D. B. 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