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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">YSXUPB</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-824</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Внутрисетевой роуминг в России: а есть ли рынок?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Intranet roaming: is there a market?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Павлова</surname><given-names>Н.С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Pavlova</surname><given-names>N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">pavlova-ns@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Мелешкина</surname><given-names>А.И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Meleshkina</surname><given-names>A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">meleshkina-ai@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Центр исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС; МГУ</aff><aff xml:lang="en">Centre for Competition and Economic Regulation Studies, Department of Competitive and Industrial Policy</aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru">Центр исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС</aff><aff xml:lang="en">Centre for Competition and Economic Regulation Studies</aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>12</volume><issue>6</issue><fpage>5</fpage><lpage>15</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Павлова Н., Мелешкина А., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Павлова Н., Мелешкина А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Pavlova N., Meleshkina A.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/824">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/824</self-uri><abstract><p>Текущее дело ФАС России в отношении крупнейших операторов сотовой связи в связи с неоправданным назначением ими разных цен за услуги связи во внутрисетевом роуминге и в домашнем регионе ставит вопрос о том, насколько корректно считать такие услуги «одним и тем же товаром» в понимании антимонопольного определения границ рынков. Для услуг связи характерна высокая степень комплементарности, в том числе трансакционной. В антимонопольной практике для определения границ рынков в подобных ситуациях, кроме узкого способа определения границ, применяются подходы кластерных рынков и рынков товаров в наборах. В статье подробно рассматриваются данные подходы, описываются критерии их использования и обосновывается применимость данных подходов к услугам сотовой связи.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The current case of the FAS Russia regarding the largest mobile communication operators setting different prices for telecommunication services in intranet roaming and in the home region poses the question of whether it is correct to consider such services as «one and the same product» in the antitrust definition of product markets. Antitrust methodology suggest that these services should then be close substitutes from the point of view of the consumers, which appears not to be the case. On the contrary, telecommunication services are characterized by a high degree of complementarity, including transaction complementarity on the consumer's side. In antitrust practice, in order to determine market boundaries in such situations, the cluster market approach and the bundling approach are used in addition to the narrow method of market definition. The article discusses in detail these approaches, describes the criteria for their use and justifies the applicability of these approaches to cellular communication services. It appears that using either the cluster market or the bundling approach to defining market boundaries in the case of intranet roaming has substantial basis. Taking specific components of a cellular tariff plan and treating them as a separate product market for antitrust purposes increases the risk of type I and type II enforcement errors.</p></trans-abstract></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Шаститко А. Е. Экономико-правовые аспекты коллективного доминирования // Экономическая политика. 2011. № 3. С. 167-190.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Шаститко А. Е. Экономико-правовые аспекты коллективного доминирования // Экономическая политика. 2011. № 3. С. 167-190.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Шаститко А. Е. Применение антимонопольного законодательства на рынках производных товаров: от определения продуктовых границ до адвокатирования конкуренции // Современная конкуренция. 2015. Т. 9. № 4 (52). 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