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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">YIZUCF</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-729</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Квазиконкуренция на рынке воздушных перевозок</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The contestibility of airline market</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Селиверстов</surname><given-names>Д.А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Seliverstov</surname><given-names>D.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">DENIS_FP@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Московский государственный институт международных отношений (Университет) МИД России</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Moscow State Institute for International Relations</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>10</volume><issue>6</issue><fpage>36</fpage><lpage>48</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Селиверстов Д., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Селиверстов Д.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Seliverstov D.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/729">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/729</self-uri><abstract><p>В научной литературе в качестве примера существования квазиконкуренции, как правило, приводят рынок воздушных перевозок. Считается, что авиакомпании могут практически с нулевыми издержками осваивать новые маршруты, используя существующий парк воздушных судов. Но отвечает ли данная отрасль критериям квазиконкуренции? В статье анализируются основные условия квазиконкуренции применительно к рынку воздушных перевозок США, в том числе роль реальной и потенциальной конкуренции, особенности барьеров входа и невозвратных издержек.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The airline industry is usually given as an example to prove the contestability theory in academic research. It is widely accepted that the carriers can with almost no cost enter new markets with the available aircraft. But does the contestability really apply to the industry?The article is aimed at analyzing the principal conditions of the contestability with regard to the U. S. airline industry, including the role of potential and real competition, the aspects of entry barriers and sunk costs. On the basis of the previous studies and research conducted in this article the author made a conclusion that the airline industry can be characterized as a weak form of the contestable market. It is explained by significant entry barriers and stronger real competition influence on the behavior of the airline market actors. At the same time the article points out an important role of the competing airline type when analyzing market structure. It was found out that the participation of low cost carriers contributes a lot to creating competitive environment. The results of the article are of value for analyzing and planning the antitrust policy of the airline market, including the Russian market.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>рынок авиаперевозок</kwd><kwd>барьеры входа</kwd><kwd>невозвратные издержки</kwd><kwd>потенциальная конкуренция</kwd><kwd>структура рынка</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>airline market</kwd><kwd>entry barriers</kwd><kwd>sunk costs</kwd><kwd>potential competition</kwd><kwd>market structure</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Лукьянов С. А., Тиссен Е. В. Рынок авиационных пассажирских перевозок России: квазиконкуренция или…? // Вопросы экономики. 2007. Т. 11. С. 120-138.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Лукьянов С. А., Тиссен Е. В. Рынок авиационных пассажирских перевозок России: квазиконкуренция или…? // Вопросы экономики. 2007. Т. 11. 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