mocoСовременная конкуренция / Journal of Modern CompetitionJournal of Modern Competition1993-75982687-0657Московский университет «Синергия»XAERNRmoco-710Research ArticleСтатьиСовременные направления развития теории фирмы в экономической наукеDevelopment of theories of the firm - modern trendsАгамироваМ.Е.AgamirovaM.Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»National Research University - Higher School of Economics201613082025104512Copyright © Агамирова М., 20252025Агамирова М.Agamirova M.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/710

Основные положения теории фирмы заложены в статье Коуза [Coase, 1937, c. 386-405], которой руководствуются экономисты, изучающие суть фирмы в различных аспектах. Эта статья положила в 1980-х годах начало трансакционной теории и теории неполноты контрактов, достаточно долго определявших основные тенденции изучения фирмы. Это привело, в свою очередь, к увеличению количества теоретических подходов, которые могут рассматриваться как дополняющие или замещающие в зависимости от того, на какой вопрос благодаря им можно получить ответ. В данной статье, ввиду существования большого количества работ, написанных под влиянием этих двух главных подходов в теории фирмы, а также широкого их обсуждения, внимание сконцентрировано на возникновении совершенно новых концепций фирмы за последние двадцать лет. Таким образом, можно проследить эволюцию методов анализа, сложившихся под воздействием исследований 1980-х годов, на основе последних работ Харта, Гиббонса, Бейкера, Мерфи, Холмстрома, посвященных развитию теорий стимулов и отношенческих контрактов.

Deficiencies of the neoclassical interpretation of the firm and dissatisfaction with economists neo classical approach to understanding the nature of the firm in the market environment led to the appearance and development of the institutional firm concepts associated with such names as Coase, Williamson, Simons, Craps, Alchian, Demsetz, Hart, Holmstrom, Jensen, Milgrom, Meckling, Baker, Gibbons, Murphy and others.The Ronald Coase article named «The nature of the firm» and published in 1937, is constantly in the spotlight a growing number of economists who study the essence of the company in various aspects. It became the basis for the emergence in the 80s transactional theory and the theory of incomplete contracts, long enough to study identifies the key trends of the firm. That in turn led to an increase in the number of theoretical approaches that can be considered as a complement or replacement depending on which question they try to answer.In this article, in view of the existence of a fairly extensive number of works that were under the influence of the two main approaches to the theory of the firm, as well as the widespread discussion it seems reasonable to focus on the emergence of a completely new concept of the firm over the past twenty years.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.