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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">VOHAIT</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-680</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Конкуренция по Курно и по Бертрану:выбор стратегической переменной на примере автомобильного рынка России</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Cournot competition vs. Bertrand competition: the choice of a strategic variable. The case of Russian automobile market</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Левина</surname><given-names>Е.А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Levina</surname><given-names>E.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">jlevina@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Покатович</surname><given-names>Е.В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Pokatovich</surname><given-names>E.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">epokatovich@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2015</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>6</issue><fpage>52</fpage><lpage>62</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Левина Е., Покатович Е., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Левина Е., Покатович Е.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Levina E., Pokatovich E.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/680">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/680</self-uri><abstract><p>В работе рассматривается олигополистическая конкуренция на рынке дифференцированного продукта. Сравнительный анализ моделей конкуренции фирм по объемам выпуска (модель Курно) и ценам (модель Бертрана) при введенных предпосылках показывает, что при конкуренции по Бертрану уровень цен будет ниже. Тогда как объемы выпуска и прибыль фирм при разных типах стратегических взаимодействий в случае, если производимые фирмами товары являются субститутами, соотносятся неоднозначно и зависят при прочих равных от степени привлекательности товара, предлагаемого фирмой. Полученные теоретические результаты проиллюстрированы на примере автомобильного рынка России. В частности, предпринята попытка отнести отдельные решения, принимаемые автопроизводителями, к той или иной стратегии конкуренции, рассмотренной в теоретической части работы.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper analyzes oligopolistic competition in a market for a differentiated product. A comparative analysis of competition models by Cournot (output competition) and Bertrand (price competition) under prerequisites put forward by the authors shows that under Bertrand competition the price level will be lower. Whereas interrelation between firms output and profit is ambiguous (if goods produced are substitutes), and depend, other things being equal, on the attractiveness of the good offered by the firm.The results obtained are illustrated using Russia’s automotive market review. In particular, an attempt is made to classify some decisions made by car producers as the one or the other competition strategy analyzed in the theoretical part of the paper.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>конкуренция по Бертрану</kwd><kwd>конкуренция по Курно</kwd><kwd>продуктовая дифференциация</kwd><kwd>автомобильный рынок</kwd><kwd>импорт автомобилей</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Bertrand model</kwd><kwd>Cournot model</kwd><kwd>product differentiation</kwd><kwd>automobile market</kwd><kwd>automobile import</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Бусыгин В. П., Желободько Е. В., Цыплаков А. А. Микроэкономика - третий уровень. В 2 томах. Новосибирск, 2008</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Бусыгин В. П., Желободько Е. В., Цыплаков А. А. Микроэкономика - третий уровень. В 2 томах. 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