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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">VOHAHP</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-678</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Программа освобождения от наказания против картельного благополучияна российских товарных рынках</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Leniency Program against collusion in the Russian markets</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Юсупова</surname><given-names>Г.Ф.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Yusupova</surname><given-names>G.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">GYusupova@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ ВШЭ</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2015</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>6</issue><fpage>20</fpage><lpage>37</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Юсупова Г., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Юсупова Г.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Yusupova G.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/678">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/678</self-uri><abstract><p>Для большинства участников сговора стимулы поддерживать соглашение связаны с высокой оценкой потоков будущей прибыли. Однако программа освобождения от наказания может воздействовать на стимулы участников поддерживать сговор через анализ изменения структуры рынка. Описанный в работе метод позволил оценить воздействие программы на поведение участников сговора на примере российских данных о характеристиках раскрытых сговоров за период 2004-2011 гг. Было показано, что применение программы освобождения от наказания в российской антимонопольной практике после реформы 2009 г. повысило стимулы к отклонению от участия в подобных соглашениях, снижая тем самым устойчивость сговора.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Most of collusion participants have incentives to commit to collusion because of their high estimations of future profits. However Leniency Program can affect incentives of collusion participants through the analysis of market structure changes. The analyses of Leniency Program effects on stability and duration of collusions increases the efficiency both the work of the antimonopoly authority and the antimonopoly policy in general.The described method in the article estimated the impact of Leniency Program on the behavior of market participants based on Russian data on detected collusions and their characteristics in2004-2011.Rule of full immunity for every application, introduced by 2007 edition of Leniency Program in Russia, supports incentives to commit to collusion, instead of refraining from illegal price fixing or market sharing. But the edition of Leniency Program that has been in place since 2009, in contrast, enhances profitability of deviation from collusion, making collusions unstable. The improved version of Leniency Program in 2009 had an impact on collusion participants which can be corresponded to high sanctions in spite of the actual sanctions had been low. So even in highly imperfect jurisdiction where the fight with collusions is weak, Leniency Program can have independent significant and can present as an effective tool.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>программа освобождения от наказания</kwd><kwd>сговор</kwd><kwd>антимонопольное законодательство</kwd><kwd>структура рынка</kwd><kwd>санкции</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>leniency program</kwd><kwd>collusion</kwd><kwd>antitrust legislation in Russia</kwd><kwd>market structure</kwd><kwd>sanctions</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Макаров А. В. Трансформация антимонопольной политики в сфере борьбы со сговором в странах переходной экономики: Россия, Украина, Казахстан // Современная конкуренция. 2014. № 2 (44). С. 39-59</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Макаров А. В. 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