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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">moco</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Современная конкуренция / Journal of Modern Competition</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of Modern Competition</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1993-7598</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2687-0657</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Московский университет «Синергия»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">UGDSPH</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">moco-660</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Оптимизация классических моделей аукциона в целях увеличения дохода аукциониста</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>About some methods of increasing revenue in the classical auctions</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Хвалынский</surname><given-names>Д.С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Khvalynskiy</surname><given-names>D.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">hdms@email.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">ФГБОУ ВПО «Алтайский государственный университет»</aff><aff xml:lang="en">Altai State University</aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2015</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>13</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>67</fpage><lpage>81</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Хвалынский Д., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Хвалынский Д.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Khvalynskiy D.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/660">https://www.moderncompetition.ru/jour/article/view/660</self-uri><abstract><p>В работе описаны условия повышения доходности четырех стандартных для мировой практики моделей аукциона - английского аукциона, аукциона второй цены (аукциона Викри), аукциона закрытых ставок и голландского аукциона. Кроме того, исследован ряд специальных моделей многообъектных аукционов, разработанных зарубежными исследователями для случаев одновременной продажи нескольких объектов: аукцион универсальной цены, аукцион «Заплати свою ставку», многообъектный аукцион Викри, иерархический аукцион пакетных ставок, механизм Викри-Кларка-Гровса, одновременные возрастающие аукционы, аукцион Аузубеля, прокси-аукцион Аузубеля, Крэмтона и Милгрома и аукцион смешанных товаров Клемперера. По результатам анализа преимуществ и недостатков существующих моделей стандартных и многообъектных аукционов автором разработана и предложена новая модель аукциона, который представляет собой симбиоз английского аукциона, аукциона закрытых ставок и аукциона Викри, предполагает заключение контрактов на основе ставок конкурентов и обеспечивает более высокий ожидаемый доход аукционисту. Рассмотрены преимущества в доходности предложенной модели аукциона по сравнению со стандартными моделями аукционов. Разработанная автором модель аукциона может найти успешное применение при формировании заказчиками правил конкурентных закупок в рамках реализации Федерального закона от 18 июля 2011 г. № 223-ФЗ «О закупках товаров, работ, услуг отдельными видами юридических лиц», а также при доработке законодателем правил конкурентных закупок, предусмотренных Федеральным законом от 5 апреля 2013 г. № 44-ФЗ «О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд».</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper presents the conditions of revenue increasing of four standard auctions: English auction, second price sealed bid auction (Vickrey auction), first price sealed bid auction and Dutch auction. Moreover, we studied a number of special models of multi-object auctions developed by foreign researchers for sale of multiple objects: Uniform-Price Auction, Pay-Your-Bid Auction, Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction, Hierarchical Package Bidding Auction, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, Simultaneous Ascending Auction, Ausubel Auction, Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom’s clock-proxy auction, product-mix auction.According to the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of existing models of standard and multi-object auctions the author have developed and proposed a new model of auction, which is a symbiosis of the English auction and the Vickrey auction. It defines the contract price on the basis of competitors` bids and provides a higher expected revenue to the auctioneer. The advantages of the proposed model` revenue compared to a standard auction models.The developed model of the auction may find successful application in the formation of auction rules in realization of the Federal law of July 18, 2011 № 223-FZ «On procurement of goods, works, services by separate types of legal entities», as well as in finalizing the legislator’s competitive procurement rules in the Federal law of April 5, 2013 № 44-FZ «On contract system in procurement of goods, works, services for state and municipal needs».</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>аукцион</kwd><kwd>оптимальный аукцион</kwd><kwd>доходность</kwd><kwd>эффективность</kwd><kwd>государственные закупки</kwd><kwd>теория эквивалентности доходов</kwd><kwd>контракт</kwd><kwd>механизм выявления</kwd><kwd>дизайн экономических механизмов</kwd><kwd>закон № 223-ФЗ</kwd><kwd>закон № 44-ФЗ</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>auction</kwd><kwd>optimal auction</kwd><kwd>profitability</kwd><kwd>efficiency</kwd><kwd>government procurement</kwd><kwd>the equivalence theory of income</kwd><kwd>contract</kwd><kwd>the mechanism of identification</kwd><kwd>design of economic mechanisms</kwd><kwd>Law No. 223-FZ</kwd><kwd>law No. 44-FZ</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Cassady R. 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